Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief (Philosophical Studies, 2017)

You can self-attribute a belief that p 'transparently' partly by judging that p. I argue that, in the relevant embedded context, an event of judging that p is also an event of self-attributing a belief that p. Seeing the identity of these mental actions in this context solves an epistemological puzzle about 'transparent' self-knowledge of belief. Published version here. Penultimate draft here.

Knowing Yourself is Something You Do (Dissertation)

Understanding intentional mental action is key to understanding the epistemology of self-knowledge. I develop a new model of 'transparent' self-knowledge centered around embedded mental action (see above). The model identifies moments of fleeting, fragile infallibility in self-awareness. It provides a recipe for producing (and solving) new Moorean paradoxes. And it shows why even 'easy' self-knowledge matters to a life well-lived. Email me for a full summary.

First-Person Authority: An Attitude Problem (Writing Sample) 

Most attempted explanations of self-knowledge of belief fail to solve a problem that I call "the attitude problem." Knowing that you believe that p, in any instance, involves knowing you take that particular attitude (belief) to the content p. Various views do not specify how you know you take the attitude of belief, rather than some other attitude, to a content you have in mind. I solve the attitude problem by explaining how we can take up attitudes intentionally in occurrent, conscious thought. When you intentionally engage in judgment, for example, you know what you are doing under a description that specifies the attitude in question. I use this observation to explain self-knowledge of belief. This writing sample includes updated sections from "Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief." Email me for a manuscript.

What Poetry Can Do and Philosophy Cannot (Second Writing Sample)

You can only phenomenally imagine what you have already experienced. But appreciating literary comparisons can nonetheless give you new phenomenal concepts, and thereby expand the range of what you can actively call to mind in phenomenal imagination. I outline the conditions that must hold to make sense of this expansion of the phenomenal imagination, and apply them to analyze some fragments of poetry. With these conditions in mind, we can see that philosophy cannot itself bring about such imaginative expansion, but poetry often does. Email me for a manuscript.


The Things at Mare's House (Short Story)

Mare, the recent widow of an acclaimed artist, tries to refuse remuneration from a guest who spills mousse de saumon on a beloved Andean rug. His insistence draws her back to a world she has been avoiding. Email me for a manuscript.

Blue Lagoon Cliff Jump (Short Story) 

A young couple's relationship comes to an abrupt, awkward end in a misunderstanding at a cliff jump on the island of Nusa Lembongan, Indonesia. Email me for a manuscript.